

**Judgement No. 32**

**Case No. 40 :**  
**Eldridge**

*Against:* **The Secretary-General  
of the United Nations**

THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

Composed of: Madame Paul Bastid, President; the Lord Crook, Vice-President; Mr. Sture Petré, Vice-President; Mr. Omar Loutfi, alternate member;

Whereas Hope Tisdale Eldridge, former member of the Statistical Office, Department of Economic Affairs, filed an application with the Tribunal on 17 February 1953 for rescission of the Secretary-General's decision of 5 December 1952 to terminate her appointment, for reinstatement in her post, and for compensation;

Whereas a memorandum was submitted to the Tribunal in her name and in the name of other Applicants;

Whereas documentary evidence in support of the amount of compensation claimed was produced on 23 and 29 July 1953;

Whereas the Respondent filed his reply to the application on 20 March 1953 and his comments concerning damages on 10 August 1953;

Whereas oral information was obtained at Headquarters from 15 to 21 April 1953 in accordance with article 9(3) of the Tribunal's Rules;

Whereas the Tribunal heard the parties in public session on 17 and 23 July 1953;

Whereas the Tribunal has received from the Staff Council of the United Nations-Secretariat a written statement of its views on the questions of principle involved in this case;

Whereas the facts of the case are as follows:

The Applicant entered the service of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in June 1947, as a statistician in the Economics and Statistics Division. After first holding a temporary, then a fixed-term contract, she received a 5-year contract dating from 1 January 1949. On 5 June 1950 she was transferred to the United Nations Secretariat with a permanent appointment as a statistician in the Statistical Office of the Department of Economic Affairs. On 15 October 1952 she appeared as a witness before the Internal Security Sub-Committee of the United States Senate, which was investigating the activities of United States citizens employed by the United Nations. At the Sub-Committee's hearing she claimed privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and refused to answer certain questions put to her, particularly with regard

to her relations with the Communist Party and with various groups. On 22 October 1952 the Secretary-General informed her that he was very much concerned about this matter, and placed her on special leave pending receipt of the advice of a group of eminent persons. On 31 October the Director of Personnel requested her not to enter United Nations Headquarters during that period of special leave.

On 1 December 1952 the Secretary-General communicated to the Applicant the "opinion" of the Commission of Jurists, drawing her attention to "the fourth part of this report, which relates to: Principles with Regard to Officers Accused or Suspected of Disloyalty to the Host Country."

He informed her of his decision to accept the Commission's recommendation and warned her that if she did fail to notify the appropriate United States authorities of her intention to withdraw the plea of privilege and to answer the pertinent questions put to her, he would be compelled to terminate her appointment in the United Nations.

The Applicant replied on 3 December 1952 that she had never broken the laws of her country or been disloyal to it, and that she had never been accused of such acts, let alone convicted of them. She was accordingly at a loss to understand the view expressed by the Secretary-General and in the jurists' opinion. In her view, she had already answered the pertinent questions put to her by the Committee.

She said that in the executive session prior to the Sub-Committee's open hearing she had been asked whether she had ever engaged in espionage or subversive activities, and that she had replied in the negative.

She affirmed her inability to change her testimony, which had been carefully considered and in accordance with fundamental moral principles she found herself unable to violate.

On receiving this negative reply, the Secretary-General informed the Applicant on 5 December 1952, that her attitude constituted a fundamental breach of the obligations laid down in staff regulation 1.4, and that he had terminated her appointment in the Secretariat. On 16 December 1952, the Secretary-General agreed to the direct submission by the Applicant of her application to the Tribunal, in accordance with article 7 of the Tribunal's Statute. On 17 February 1953 the Applicant filed an application with the Tribunal for reinstatement in her former post and damages.

Whereas the Applicant's principal contentions are as follows:

(a) The decision contested is illegal and void, as it resulted from an agreement between the United States State Department and the Secretary-General to terminate on political grounds the appointment of United States citizens who are members of the United Nations staff. The decision contested was the result of improper pressure exerted upon the Secretary-General by an agency of a Member State, namely

the Internal Security Sub-Committee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate. Consequently there was a violation of Article 100 of the Charter and staff regulations 1.1, 1.3 and 1.9.

(b) The termination of the Applicant's appointment was improper in that it was based on arbitrary and extraneous political considerations, particularly upon the supposition that the Applicant was suspected of Communist affiliations which are regarded with disfavour and opposed by United States governmental agencies.

(c) The termination violates the fundamental tenure rights of the Applicant, who held a permanent contract, since it was not effected in accordance with the pertinent Staff Regulations. Holders of permanent contracts can only be discharged for the reasons stated in staff regulations 9.1 and 10.2.

(d) The plea of privilege under the Fifth Amendment does not constitute a breach of the Staff Regulations, particularly of staff regulation 1.4, since under American law the exercise of the privilege does not create presumption of guilt. American staff members of the United Nations have not agreed as a condition of their employment to surrender their rights under the Constitution. Essentially, the Applicant tried to protect her freedom under the Fifth Amendment.

(c) The Secretary-General violated the principles of due process in placing the Applicant upon special leave, in denying her a hearing before taking the decision to dismiss and in failing to consult the joint bodies as laid down in staff regulations 8.1 and 8.2 dealing with staff relations.

Whereas the Respondent, while contending that various arguments set forth by the Applicant were irrelevant to the case, made the following reply:

(a) The Secretary-General confined himself to receiving information on staff members under the agreement made with the State Department, and at no time did he surrender his power of decision with respect to the retention or appointment of staff.

(b) The Applicant had the duty under the Charter and under staff regulation 1.4 to conduct herself at all times in a manner befitting her status as an international civil servant and to remain worthy of trust and confidence.

(c) Her refusal to answer on the plea of privilege under the Fifth Amendment, while legal according to American law, gave rise to the presumption that the Applicant was or had been engaged in activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the government of a Member State. Her claim of privilege constituted a public pronouncement which reflected adversely upon the international civil service and rendered her unworthy of trust and confidence.

(d) The Applicant was guilty of serious misconduct and her services

were shown to be unsatisfactory. Her appointment could therefore be terminated under staff regulations 9.1(a) and 10.2.

(e) The Secretary-General observed the principles of due process, since he gave the Applicant an opportunity of revoking her decision and of answering the questions put to her by the Senate Sub-Committee. Before taking the decision to terminate her appointment, the Secretary-General consulted a group of senior Secretariat officials, to whom her letter of refusal had been referred.

The Tribunal having deliberated until 21 August 1953, now pronounces the following judgement :

1. Under its Statute the Tribunal is not competent to pass judgment on the validity, in relation to the Charter, of an agreement made between the Secretary-General and a Member State, whatever influence this agreement may actually have had on the decision taken in regard to the Applicant. It is the Tribunal's duty, however, to consider whether the termination of the Applicant's appointment is in conformity with the provisions of the Staff Rules and Regulations.

2. The Tribunal notes that the Applicant held a permanent appointment. This type of appointment has been used from the inception of the Secretariat to ensure the stability of the international civil service and to create a genuine body of international civil servants freely selected by the Secretary-General. Under the regulations established by the General Assembly, permanent appointments cannot be terminated except in accordance with the Staff Regulations, which list exhaustively the grounds on which and the conditions in which an appointment may be terminated.

Thus the Secretary-General can only act under a provision of the Staff Regulations. He must indicate the provisions upon which he proposes to rely, and conform with the conditions and procedures laid down in the Staff Regulations.

If he fails to comply with these principles, the Tribunal is entitled to enquire whether the termination of the appointment is in accordance with the rules in force and so valid.

3. The Applicant held a permanent contract and her exceptional professional ability and devotion to duty have not been disputed. The termination of her appointment was decided upon by the Secretary-General following the report of the Commission of three jurists whom he consulted. In his letter of 1 December 1952 to the Applicant, the Secretary-General wrote :

“ I have decided to accept the recommendation of the Commission regarding the attitude the Secretary-General should take towards an officer who pleads some constitutional privilege against answering questions on the grounds that answers might incriminate him with regard to activities involving disloyalty to the United States. This recommendation was to the effect that a person who has refused to

answer questions whether he is or has been engaged in espionage or other subversive activities in the United States, or whether he is or has at any time been a member of the Communist Party in the United States, or of some other organization declared to be a subversive organization, is unsuitable for continued employment by the United Nations in the United States and that his employment in the United Nations should not be continued”.

The decision to terminate the Applicant's employment rests on the recommendation of the three jurists, and states that the refusal to answer the questions “constitutes a fundamental breach of the obligations laid down in Staff Regulation 1.4, and that you [the Applicant] are unsuitable for continued employment in the Secretariat.”

4. The three jurists tried to find a legal basis for the termination of the appointments of staff members pleading privilege under the Fifth Amendment. They started from the concept that “the rights of the staff in matters of their employment are contractual and that the terms of the contract are to be found in the Staff Regulations and the rules promulgated as Staff Rules in pursuance of the Regulations.”

They then propounded general principles for dealing with breaches of the obligations laid down in the Staff Regulations and for termination indemnities :

“a fundamental breach by a staff member of his obligations laid down in articles 1.4 and 1.8 is intended to be dealt with by the Secretary-General on his own responsibility, although in many cases such a fundamental breach would also be serious misconduct under article 10. We think also that the provisions with regard to termination indemnity contained in annex III to the Regulations apply only in cases arising under article 9.1 and not in cases of fundamental breaches of articles 1.4 or 1.8 or in the case of dismissal under article 10”.

They went on :

“It will be observed that, in our opinion, it will be necessary to rely upon the Secretary-General's inherent right to terminate a contract for fundamental breach under article 1.4 or article 1.8 only in cases of officers holding permanent or fixed-term appointments whose actions could not be said to constitute serious misconduct under article 10.”

Thus, the three jurists reached the conclusion that the Respondent possessed a right to terminate appointments which were not covered by the Staff Regulations, and moreover, to terminate them without indemnity.

In actual fact, no provision concerning the termination of employment was cited in this case, and the Applicant received an indemnity in accordance with annex III of the Staff Regulations.

Thus the decision reached in respect of the termination of the Applicant's appointment did not correspond exactly with the recommendations of the jurists.

5. The Tribunal notes that the opinion of the three jurists—according to which the Secretary-General can go beyond the provisions of the Staff Regulations and terminate an appointment because of the contractual relationship between a staff member and the Secretary-General—disregards the nature of permanent contracts and the character of the regulations governing termination of employment established by the General Assembly under Article 101 of the Charter.

6. When before the Tribunal, however, the Respondent did not advance these arguments of the jurists. He held that the breach of staff regulation 1.4 could be dealt with both under regulation 9.1 and under regulation 10 and treated as both unsatisfactory service and serious misconduct enabling the Secretary-General to dismiss the Applicant without disciplinary measures. In the latter case, according to the Respondent, it was not for the Applicant to protest against the *ex gratia* payment of an indemnity. The Tribunal has therefore to inquire whether any one provision of the Staff Regulations was applicable to the case of the Applicant.

7. Staff regulation 9.1 provides for termination of employment for unsatisfactory services. Staff regulation 10 deals with misconduct and authorizes summary dismissal for serious misconduct.

The scope of the term “unsatisfactory services” is to be determined by examination of the meaning given to the word “services” in the Staff Regulations and Rules. It appears clearly that the word “services” is used in the Staff Regulations and Rules solely to designate professional behaviour within the Organization and not to cover all the obligations incumbent on a staff member. If it is admitted that the plea of constitutional privilege in respect of acts outside a staff member's professional duties constitutes a breach of staff regulation 1.4, this fact cannot be considered as unsatisfactory services and cannot fall within the purview of staff regulation 9.1.

On the other hand, misconduct punishable under staff regulation 10 could be either misconduct committed in the exercise of a staff member's professional duties or acts committed outside his professional activities but prohibited by provisions creating general obligations for staff members.

This view is confirmed by the fact that, during the discussions in the Fifth Committee on the revision of the Staff Regulations, the question of dealing with obligations deriving from staff regulation 1.4 was raised and no objection was made to the statement by the Chairman of the Fifth Committee that they were dealt with under the disciplinary provisions.

8. The Tribunal is thus called upon to consider whether the

allegations against the Applicant constituted serious misconduct justifying her summary dismissal by the Secretary-General without reference to the Joint Disciplinary Committee.

The conception of serious misconduct enabling the Secretary-General to inflict summary dismissal without disciplinary procedure was introduced at the revision of the Staff Regulations to deal with acts obviously incompatible with continued membership of the staff.

Except in cases of agreement between the person concerned and the Administration the disciplinary procedure should be dispensed with only in those cases where the misconduct is patent and where the interest of the service requires immediate and final dismissal.

9. In the present case, the Applicant invoked the privilege provided for in the constitution of his country. This step did not give rise to subsequent legal proceedings against the Applicant. This provision of the constitution may be properly invoked in various situations which, because of the complexity of the case law, cannot be summarized in a simple formula.

The legal situation resulting from recourse to the Fifth Amendment was so obscure to the Secretary-General himself that he considered it desirable to seek clarification from a Commission of Jurists. Their conclusions were later discussed by the General Assembly, which reached no decision on them. Subsequently, these conclusions were partially set aside by the Secretary-General himself.

The nature of serious misconduct appeared so disputable to the Secretary-General that he granted termination indemnities, which are expressly forbidden by the Staff Regulations (annex III) in cases of summary dismissal.

Whatever view may be held as to the conduct of the Applicant, that conduct could not be described as serious misconduct, which alone under staff regulation 10.2 and the relevant Rules, justifies the Secretary-General in dismissing a staff member summarily without the safeguard afforded by the disciplinary procedure.

10. In these circumstances, the decision to terminate the Applicant's appointment, since it cannot be based upon the provisions of the Staff Regulations and Rules, must be declared illegal.

11. Whereas the Tribunal has received claims in respect of the period up to date of re-instatement as follows :

(a) for full salary up to date of re-instatement, less amount paid at termination in lieu of notice ;

(b) additional remedial relief to the extent of \$7,100 ;  
and has considered the Respondent's reply ;

the Tribunal awards :

(a) full salary up to the date of re-instatement less the amount paid

at termination in lieu of notice and less also the amount of termination indemnity ;

(b) no remedial relief  
and so orders.

12. Whereas the Tribunal having received from the Applicant a request for re-imbusement of legal costs amounting to \$2,375 notes, with regard to its power to pronounce on such requests, that article 12 of its Rules authorizes applicants to be represented by counsel, and that accordingly costs may be incurred in submitting claims. It recalls that in a general statement of 14 December 1950 it pointed out that it could grant compensation for such costs if they are demonstrated to have been unavoidable, if they are reasonable in amount and if they exceed the normal expenses of litigation before the Tribunal. Recalling the case law of the League of Nations Tribunal (Judgements No. 13 of 7 March 1934 and No. 24 of 26 February 1946), "il n'y a aucune raison pour déroger au principe général de droit que les dépens, sauf compensation, sont payés par la partie qui succombe", the Tribunal considers that it is competent to pronounce upon the costs.

The Tribunal awards an amount of \$300  
and so orders.

(Signatures)

Suzanne BASTID  
*President*

CROOK  
*Vice-President*

Sture PETRÉN  
*Vice-President*

Omar LOUTFI  
*Alternate Member*

Mani SANASEN  
*Executive Secretary*

Geneva, 21 August 1953

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## Judgement No. 33

**Case No. 41 :**  
**Glassman**

**Against: The Secretary-General  
of the United Nations**

THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

Composed of Madame Paul Bastid, President ; the Lord Crook, Vice-President ; Mr. Sture Petré, Vice-President, Mr. Omar Loutfi, alternate member ;