



Administrative Tribunal

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ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

Judgement No. 1359

Case No.1437

Against: The Secretary-General
of the United Nations

THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

Composed of Mr. Spyridon Flogaitis, President; Mr. Julio Barboza; Ms. Brigitte Stern;

Whereas at the request of a staff member of the United Nations, the President of the Tribunal extended to 30 September 2005 the time limit for the filing of an application with the Tribunal;

Whereas, on 8 September 2005, the Applicant filed an Application containing pleas requesting the Tribunal *inter alia*:

“... ”

(b) to rescind the implicit decision of the Secretary-General refusing to resume proceedings before the Joint Appeals Board [(JAB)], or to order a review and investigate the incidents of harassment and obstruction against the Applicant;

(c) to order that the Applicant's complaints of harassment and career obstruction must be investigated in accordance with due process and with pertinent administrative instructions and procedures;

(d) to order, should the Respondent decide that the case should be remanded to the appropriate venue for institution or correction of the required procedure, in accordance with article 10 (2) of the Tribunal's Statute, that 3 months' net base salary be paid to the Applicant as compensation;

(e) to award the Applicant appropriate and adequate compensation to be determined by the Tribunal for the actual, consequential and moral damages suffered by the Applicant as a result of the Respondent's actions or lack thereof, for the harm to his dignity, to his health, to his career, to his family life and for the abusive delays in the handling of his case;

(f) to fix pursuant to article 9, paragraph 1 of the Statute and Rules, the amount of compensation to be paid in lieu of specific performance by the Secretary-General within three months of the judgement, by a full-fledged investigation, at three years' net base pay in view of the special circumstances of the case;

(g) [to order], should the findings of this investigation support the allegations set out ... by the Applicant and should no action in redress be taken by the Respondent based on the findings of this investigation within [three] months of their submission to the Secretary-General, the Secretary-General [to] pay to the Applicant compensation in an amount equivalent to three (3) years of net base salary, consistent with the Tribunal's award in other cases of major maladministration of human resources, and in view of the exceptional anxiety, stress, distress, frustration, mental anguish, professional and physical harm caused to the Applicant in this case;

And [to] order the Secretary-General

- That a public apology be issued to the Applicant
- That the Applicant be placed in a post relevant to his qualifications
- That the Applicant be properly trained for his functions
- That the Applicant's job description be properly defined
- That a retroactive promotion to the Applicant be executed
- That no further retaliation takes place against the Applicant
- That sanctions, in accordance with staff rule 112.3, be imposed on the senior officials responsible for the improprieties and abuses of authority committed in the is case against the Applicant"

Whereas at the request of the Respondent, the President of the Tribunal granted an extension of the time limit for filing a Respondent's answer until 6 March 2006 and once thereafter until 6 April 2006;

Whereas the Respondent filed his Answer on 6 April 2006;

Whereas the Applicant filed Written Observations on 6 May 2006;

Whereas the statement of facts, including the employment record, contained in the report of the JAB reads, in part, as follows:

“Employment History

... [The Applicant] was recruited by the United Nations as an Associate Programme Budget Officer in September 1989 in the Central Monitoring Unit (...), Department of Administration and Management. [Between July 1993 and January 1999, he was reassigned several times within the Department.] In January 1999, he was transferred to Central Support Service, [Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts, Department of Management]. On 30 June 2003, he was transferred to [the Office for Human Resources Management (OHRM)].

Summary of the facts

... On 27 June 2003, [the Applicant] received the following note from his supervisor ...:

‘Consequent to your reassignment ..., I would appreciate it if you could identify, and deposit today ... all the working files and other relating documentation concerning the budget sections which were ... under your responsibility. As your current office (...) is required to accommodate other staff, it would be appreciated if you could remove your personal effects by noon Monday, 30 June 2003.’

... On 21 August 2003, [the Applicant] sent an email to [the] Ombudsman. [He] referred to four meetings in her office since the beginning of 2003, wherein he sought her mediation and assistance

regarding, in [the Applicant's] words, violations of his staff rights with respect to his [performance evaluation], lack of job description, the unfairness of his job classification and the lack of promotion opportunities. He also refers to 'removal of documents from my personal file (notes written by me back in 1999),' and lack of proper intervention by the Executive Office and OHRM. In the same email, he brought to her attention his transfer to OHRM. He requested information on, inter alia, the results of her mediation efforts to that point, and a number of other issues regarding his grievances. He closed by stating:

'In the event I do not receive an answer to this letter within a reasonable time, i.e., one month, and given the desperate nature of my situation, I will have no other choice than proceeding to file a harassment case, based on breach of my conditions of work and of the provisions of the Staff Regulations and Rules in connection with harassment cases ...'

... On 31 October 2003, [the Applicant] submitted a request for administrative review 'on the Ombudsman Decision Refusing to Conduct an Investigation on the Abuses, Discrimination and Harassment Against Me'. [In his letter, he asked the Administration to launch an investigation into his claims.]

... By a letter dated 24 November 2003, [the Applicant was informed:] 'your request for administrative review is not receivable as the Ombudsman does not have decision-making powers and therefore could not have taken any administrative decision in the meaning of staff regulation 11.1.'

... On 22 December 2003, [the Applicant], through Counsel, filed his statement of appeal with the JAB [in New York]."

The JAB adopted its report on 8 February 2005. Its considerations, conclusions and recommendations read, in part, as follows:

“Considerations

12. The Panel examined the question of its competence to review the case under Rule 111.2(j), specifically, whether there was an administrative decision in the instant case falling within the jurisdiction of the JAB under Staff Regulation 11.1. ... The Panel ... noted that, in [his] request, Appellant in fact had sought two reviews: the ... review of a decision by the Ombudsman not to investigate, and the second, a review or investigation by the Secretary-General into the situation in which the Ombudsman had decided not to investigate or mediate. A written decision exists neither from the Ombudsman nor the Secretary-General.

...

15. The Panel considered that any decisions taken by or on behalf of the Secretary-General were, of course, administrative decisions. It found therefore that a decision by the Administration not to inquire into allegations of harassment in a given instance would be appropriate for JAB consideration.

16. With regard to the other decision, the Panel noted that the Ombudsman's lack of decision-making power under ST/SGB/2002/12, section 3.8 – the basis of Respondent's contention – goes to the issue of whether that Office is endowed with any authority over the *outcome* of a given conflict, rather than to an obligation to intervene in that conflict in the first place. However, the Ombudsman's lack of authority over an outcome of a conflict also indicates her lack of decision-making power over a staff member's terms of reference. By the same token, it seems doubtful that, for purposes of an appeal (or any other purposes), the decision by the Office of the Ombudsman can be considered a 'decision taken by the Administration.' By its terms of reference, the Ombudsman is a neutral third-party whose reason for being is to address conflicts between staff members and the Administration; any role beyond that would directly conflict with this fundamental mandate. In any case, insofar as the Ombudsman is 'independent of any United Nations Organ or official,' (...), the JAB has no competence to make recommendations pertaining to decisions by the office regarding whether to intervene in a given conflict between staff and the Administration, since the

Secretary-General, as head of a principal United Nations organ, would have no authority to act on those recommendations.

17. The Panel furthermore doubted whether the terms of reference bear out [the] Appellant's claim ... that the Ombudsman 'can and must decide' - in an actionable way - 'how to 'advise and make suggestions or recommendations as appropriate on actions needed to settle conflicts ...' a power and authority vested by [United Nations] legislation which she failed to exercise in this case.' Again, this section describes decision-making power over individual conflicts rather than any forward duty to intervene all such cases. The language promulgating the Office - which is first and foremost a dispute-resolution rather than an investigatory instrument - does not speak to a mandate to facilitate the resolution of every conflict (nor does it mandate that the Ombudsman conduct an investigation in every conflict which she does facilitate), no matter how desirable it otherwise may be to do so. The terms of reference seem to create broad discretion, recognizing, for example, that intervention by the Ombudsman is not necessarily appropriate to all conflicts, ... '... As necessary, the Ombudsman shall refer staff to the other means of conflict resolution.' The decision to facilitate or not facilitate lies within her discretion.

18. However, bearing in mind the need to respect the neutrality and independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, the Panel would have expected some form of advice or at least a reply to the Appellant from the Office of the Ombudsman, which in this case regrettably was not provided. The foregoing nonetheless indicates that clearly Ombudsman's terms of reference take the Office's decisions outside the purview of the Secretary-General.

Conclusions and recommendation

19. In light of the foregoing, the Panel concluded that it had no competence with regard to the decision of the Ombudsman not to investigate the issues raised by Appellant. However, the Panel found that these contentions do fall within the scope of its competence with regard to the Administration's decision not to itself investigate. The Panel concluded that with regard to this latter decision the appeal is receivable."

On 4 May 2005, the Officer-in-Charge of the Department of Management transmitted a copy of the JAB report to the Applicant and informed him that the Secretary-General agreed with the its conclusion that decisions of the Ombudsman were not subject to appeal.

On 8 September 2005, the Applicant filed the above-referenced Application with the Tribunal.

Whereas the Applicant's principal contentions are:

1. The Respondent has a duty to investigate serious allegations of misconduct raised by a staff member.
2. The JAB violated the requirements of the Staff Regulations and Rules and pertinent administrative instructions by neither resuming its proceedings, nor undertaking the required investigation on harassment and obstruction incidents committed against the Applicant.

Whereas the Respondent's principal contentions are:

1. The Secretary-General's decision not to investigate the Applicant's allegations of harassment has not been subject to an administrative review. The appeal of this decision is not receivable.
2. The Applicant's rights were not violated by the JAB not resuming its proceedings or investigating his allegations of harassment.

3. None of the Applicant's rights have been violated and, accordingly, he is not entitled to any compensation.

The Tribunal, having deliberated from 29 October to 21 November 2007, renders the following judgement:

I. The Applicant joined the Organization in September 1989 after a competitive examination. Since his recruitment to a P-2 post, the Applicant, who has a permanent contract, has worked in the Department of Management, formerly known as the Department of Administration and Management. Complaining of the behaviour of the Administration towards him, in particular the lack of a job description for his post which allegedly has blocked him from any expectation of promotion, the Applicant contacted the Ombudsman early in 2003, met with her several times, then wrote her a letter on 21 August to convey his distress and summarize his grievances. Having received no reply, on 31 October the Applicant requested the Secretary-General to reconsider the decision of the Ombudsman to refuse to open an investigation into the "unbearable and prolonged harassment" to which he has allegedly been subjected for several years. Through the Chief of the Administrative Law Unit of the Office of Human Resources Management, the Secretary-General, in a letter dated 24 November 2003, informed the Applicant that he rejected his appeal on the grounds that the Ombudsman, who has no decision-making power, could not take an administrative decision that could be the subject of an appeal in the meaning of regulation 11.1 of the Staff Regulations. On 8 February 2005, the JAB, which had been requested by the Applicant to assess the legality of this decision, while declaring itself not competent to review the complaint regarding the refusal of the Ombudsman to open an investigation, discerned in the letter of 24 November 2003 an implied decision by the Administration not to open an investigation and declared its competence to hear that appeal. In a letter dated 4 May 2005, the Secretary-General stated that he agreed with the conclusion of the JAB that it had no competence with regard to the Ombudsman's decisions. The Applicant is bringing this decision of the Secretary-General to the attention of the Tribunal.

II. The Applicant's principal requests, as the Tribunal understands them after reading the somewhat confusing submission, can be summarized as follows:

- The Applicant appeals the decision of the Secretary-General to accept the conclusion of the JAB that it had no competence to review the Ombudsman's decisions;
- He requests the Tribunal to rescind the Administration's implied decision not to order an investigation and to order such an investigation;
- He requests the Tribunal to "find and rule that the [JAB]'s proceedings violated the requirements of the Staff Regulations and Rules...";
- He requests various amounts of compensation for various reasons.

Before examining these requests, the Tribunal wishes once again to draw the attention of applicants to the need to present their applications with clarity and in particular to indicate which decisions by the Administration

they are appealing before the Tribunal. (See, for example, Judgement No. 1248 (2005).) In the light of the varying possible interpretations of the Applicant's requests, the Tribunal will examine them all, to satisfy the requirements of full and fair procedure, but it is evident that judicial economy would have been better served by a clearer presentation of the Application. At the heart of the matter lies the question of the definition of what constitutes an "administrative decision". This will provide an opportunity for the Tribunal to explore the concept of an administrative decision, both from the perspective of *ratione personae* - which bodies can take decisions? - and of *ratione materiae* - is the content of a decision an action or a review, when is it a question of an implied decision?

III. As the Applicant's principal plea regards the Secretary-General's decision of 4 May 2005, the Tribunal will therefore examine it first. In this letter, the Administration endorses the conclusion of the JAB that it is not competent to hear an appeal of an implied decision of the Ombudsman, who did not respond to the Applicant's request that an investigation should be launched in order to establish the harassment to which he had been allegedly subjected and to permit disciplinary action against its perpetrators.

IV. In order to evaluate the legality of the decision of 4 May 2005, the Tribunal will determine whether or not the JAB was justified in declaring itself not competent. In its report dated 8 February 2005, the JAB considered that, as the Ombudsman had no power of decision, her measures could not be considered administrative decisions; as an appeal can only be considered when there is an administrative decision, the measures taken by the Ombudsman are thus not subject to appeal. As will be developed in the rest of this Judgement, the Tribunal cannot but agree with these two statements: first, the Ombudsman does not take administrative decisions; second, and consequently, there is no possibility of appealing the action of the Ombudsman.

V. The Tribunal will first examine the nature of the functions and the legal competence of the Ombudsman. It appears, first of all, that the Ombudsman, while appointed by the Secretary-General, cannot be considered part of the hierarchical structure of the Administration. Indeed, it is specified in bulletin ST/SGB/2002/12 of 15 October 2002, establishing the Office of the Ombudsman, that "[i]n the performance of his or her duties, the Ombudsman shall be independent of any United Nations organ or official" (Section 3.2), and Section 1 recalls that he or she is "an impartial and independent person". Furthermore, the role of the Ombudsman is to be an intermediary, not a decision-maker. According to the JAB, it must be duly noted that the Ombudsman's lack of decision-making power is demonstrated through the inability to impose a binding solution upon a conflict between the Organization and a staff member:

"The Ombudsman's lack of authority over an outcome of a conflict also indicates her lack of decision-making power over a staff member's terms of reference. By the same token, it seems doubtful that, for purposes of an appeal (or any other purposes), the decision by the Office of the Ombudsman can be considered a 'decision taken by the Administration'. By its terms of reference, the Ombudsman is a neutral third party whose reason for being is to address conflicts between staff members and the Administration; any role beyond that would directly conflict with this fundamental mandate."

The Tribunal fully shares the view of the JAB. In this regard, the Tribunal believes it appropriate to recall an extract from section 3.8 of ST/SGB/2002/12, which established the Office of the Ombudsman, whereby:

“The Ombudsman shall not have decision-making powers, but shall advise and make suggestions or recommendations, as appropriate, on actions needed to settle conflicts, taking into account the rights and obligations existing between the Organization and the staff member, and the equities of the situation.” (Emphasis added by the Tribunal.)

In the absence of decision-making power, there is no doubt - it is even tautological - that the Ombudsman is unable to take an administrative decision. In Judgement No. 1157, *Andronov* (2004), para. V, the Tribunal very clearly indicated what should be understood by this expression:

“There is no dispute as to what an ‘administrative decision’ is. It is acceptable by all administrative law systems, that an ‘administrative decision’ is a unilateral decision taken by the administration in a precise individual case (individual administrative act), which produces direct legal consequences to the legal order. Thus, the administrative decision is distinguished from other administrative acts, such as those having regulatory power (which are usually referred to as rules or regulations), as well as from those not having direct legal consequences. Administrative decisions are therefore characterized by the fact that they are taken by the Administration, they are unilateral and of individual application, and they carry direct legal consequences.”

Here, the Tribunal cannot characterize the Ombudsman’s refusal to open an investigation as an “administrative decision”, in that this refusal was not by the Administration nor did it have direct legal consequences.

VI. The conclusion that the Ombudsman cannot take a decision, whether explicit or implicit, leads unavoidably to the fact that no appeal of her actions, advice, views, proposals, recommendations or lack thereof is possible. Indeed, regulation 11.1 of the Staff Regulations states, without any possible ambiguity:

*“The Secretary-General shall establish administrative machinery with staff participation to advise him in case of any appeal by staff members against an *administrative decision* alleging the non-observance of their terms of appointment, including all pertinent regulations and rules, or against disciplinary action.”* (Emphasis added by the Tribunal.)

The Tribunal deduces from this that the decisions of the Ombudsman are not subject to appeal and, thus, the JAB rightly declared that it was not competent to hear a case of an “implied decision” made by her. It thus confirms its own lack of competence to hear an appeal against an action by the Ombudsman.

VII. The Tribunal now turns to an aspect of the request that is more complex because it is rather confused. Aside from his request for the repeal of the *implied decision of the Ombudsman* not to launch an investigation, the Applicant also asks the Tribunal to repeal the *implied decision of the Administration* to refuse to launch an investigation into the alleged harassment he has suffered. It should thus be determined if and when the Administration took such an implied decision, by carefully examining the various procedural twists and turns which resulted in this case being brought before the Tribunal.

VIII. Having contacted the Ombudsman in early 2003 and not having obtained the launching of the requested investigation, the Applicant turned to the Administration, to which he sent a letter on 31 October 2003, the interpretation of which is somewhat unclear. The Tribunal is concerned by the ambiguity in this letter from the Applicant to the Secretary-General. It can be interpreted not only as an appeal against the action - or more precisely the lack of action - by the Ombudsman but also as a request for action. This question is debatable, to the extent that, while the letter is entitled "Request for an Administrative Review on the Ombudsman's Decision Refusing to Conduct an Investigation on the Abuses, Discrimination and Harassment against Me", which at first seems to indicate that only the actions of the Ombudsman are in question, the Applicant also explicitly requests that an investigation be launched and disciplinary action taken, which can be taken to mean that he is addressing the Secretary-General directly. The Tribunal notes, in particular, that in the summary of his Application, it is stated that "on 31 October 2003 ... the Applicant sought a formal review and investigation by the Secretary-General of these harassment and career obstruction incidents". Furthermore, although the title is more restrictive, it seems to the Tribunal that the Applicant clearly makes a request of the Administration in the body of his letter, when he writes:

"I request that an investigation be undertaken on these abuses and mismanagement of human resources, and that disciplinary procedures against my supervisors ... be filed for the discrimination and harassment to which they have subjected me in recent years, resulting in lost career opportunities, moral sufferings, attacks on my professionalism, slander on my reputation, physical stress and anxiety which will all be substantiated and corroborated during your investigation, through compelling evidence."

IX. The interpretation of the content of this letter affects the interpretation of the Administration's reply dated 24 November 2003, which refers explicitly and exclusively to the request for review of the implied decision of the Ombudsman, which request the Administration rejected, not on the basis that the Ombudsman had made an implied administrative decision, but because she had not made an administrative decision. No express mention was made of the request addressed to the Administration. Nevertheless, it is not impossible to analyse the lack of an explicit reply to the request for an investigation as an implied decision to refuse to conduct one. This is the analysis made by the JAB, according to which the Secretary-General's letter of 24 November 2003 to the Applicant contains not only the rejection of his request concerning the Ombudsman, but also the implied decision by the Administration not to open an investigation itself. While the Administration seems to recognize in its letters the existence of this implied decision, it does, however, contest the receivability of the request concerning it. The Administration maintains that, as with any administrative decision, the Applicant, before informing the JAB, should have requested a re-examination of the implied decision of 24 November 2003. In other words, according to the Respondent, as the decision was not made the subject of administrative review before being brought to the JAB, the Applicant's request is not receivable, and the JAB should have so stated.

X. In the view of the Tribunal, if the letter of 31 October 2003 is considered a request for administrative action, which is the most plausible interpretation, the implied denial of the request for an investigation by the Administration in its letter of 24 November 2003 could indeed not be subject to appeal before the JAB, inasmuch as

the Applicant should first have requested the administrative reconsideration and re-examination of this implied decision. In the absence of such a request, the appeal entered against the implied decision not to open an investigation is not receivable. This accords with established jurisprudence, as expressed, in particular, in Judgement No. 1235 (2005):

“It was important for the Tribunal in this case, then, to review the letter in question, in order to determining whether or not it comprised a request for administrative review. Having done so, the Tribunal agrees with the JAB that it was not a request for administrative review but, rather, a request for administrative action to be taken. [...] Whilst the Tribunal condemns the Administration’s practice of ignoring written requests from its staff members, its failure to act may be considered an implied rejection of the Applicant’s request for action, *which then ought to have been followed by a request for administrative review of the Administration’s decision not to take such action. The Applicant failed to perform this final, and crucial, step.* (Emphasis added by the Tribunal.)

This approach is merely the application of rule 111.2 (a) of the Staff Rules, the relevant portion of which states:

“A staff member wishing to appeal an administrative decision pursuant to staff regulation 11.1 shall, *as a first step*, address a letter to the Secretary-General requesting that the administrative decision be reviewed; such letter must be sent within two months from the date the staff member received notification of the decision in writing”. (Emphasis added by the Tribunal.)

Here, even by interpreting the letter of 24 November 2003 as containing an implied decision, the Tribunal notes that the Applicant never requested administrative review of said decision. Consequently, the Tribunal considers that the request should have been declared not receivable by the JAB, thus leading *a fortiori* to the conclusion that the Application to the Tribunal, with respect to this implied decision, was not receivable.

XI. However, the Tribunal notes that the JAB, mistaking a request for review for a request for action, considered the Applicant’s request on this point receivable. Even based on this hypothesis, which is particularly favourable to the Applicant, the Tribunal must nevertheless declare the request non-receivable. The JAB, after having declared receivable the Applicant’s appeal against the implied decision not to launch an investigation against his supervisors, for reasons that are unclear and which need not be examined here, never did review its substance and thus did not take a position on the legality of this decision. In other words, even considering that the lack of a request for administrative review had been “remedied” when the JAB declared the request receivable, the Tribunal must state that the administrative review procedure was not completed. Thus, according to a careful analysis, two steps were lacking in the procedure to be followed before submitting a case to the Tribunal, or at the very least, taking a more flexible approach, one of these steps. The request for review of the implied decision by the Administration not to launch an investigation should thus, in any case, be declared non-receivable.

XII. Although the request is not receivable, the Tribunal considers it appropriate, in the interests of the proper administration of justice, to recall certain general principles of jurisprudence. The Tribunal wishes to emphasize

that even though it ruled on the receivability of the request concerning the Administration's implied decision, it would not have been able to accede to the Applicant's request. Indeed, it is well established that the Administration has discretionary power to launch an investigation. In other words, any administrative decision regarding the instigation of such a procedure could not infringe on any *right* of the Applicant. Judgement No. 1086, *Fayache* (2002), para. V, is particularly instructive in this regard:

“Furthermore, the Tribunal takes this opportunity to underline that the instigation of disciplinary charges against an employee is the privilege of the Organization itself. The Organization, responsible as it is for personnel management, has, among other rights, the right to take disciplinary action against one or more of its employees and, if it does that unlawfully, the Administrative Tribunal will be the final arbiter of the case. *It is not legally possible for anyone to compel the Administration to take disciplinary action against another party.*” (Emphasis added by the Tribunal.)


XIII. A final point remains to be examined: the request of the Applicant that the Tribunal should declare that the proceedings before the JAB were conducted in violation of the rules of the Organization. The Tribunal thus arrives at the Applicant's allegation that the JAB, after having declared itself competent to hear the appeal against the Administration's implied decision of 24 November 2003, did not follow through on its own statements by refusing to determine whether or not the Applicant's rights had been violated. The Tribunal strongly emphasizes that it is not among its responsibilities to oversee the manner in which the JAB drafts its reports. Like the Ombudsman, the JAB, with no decision-making power, only issues recommendations, non-binding measures which the Secretary-General can follow or refuse to accept. Neither a recommendation of the JAB nor the lack thereof, which is the scenario in this case, can be the subject of an appeal to the Tribunal. Although the Tribunal is surprised that the JAB was satisfied with declaring itself competent without subsequently examining the legality of the implied decision of the Secretary-General of 24 November 2003, the Board simply issued a recommendation which was in no way binding on the Secretary-General. The Applicant cannot, therefore, raise an argument based on the violation by the JAB of the Staff Regulations and Rules as well as the relevant administrative instructions, and the request to declare the administrative proceedings illegal before the JAB should be declared not receivable.

XIV. In view of the foregoing, the Tribunal declares the Application not receivable in its entirety.


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
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Julio Barboza
Member

Handwritten signature of Brigitte Stern in black ink.

Brigitte Stern
Member

New York, 21 November 2007

Handwritten signature of Maritza Struyvenberg in black ink.

Maritza Struyvenberg
Executive Secretary